Archive for May, 2010

John Taylor on the European Central Bank

Thursday, May 13th, 2010

Stanford economist John Taylor does not think much of the €750bn European rescue plan, but what alarms him is “the agreement by the European Central Bank [ECB] to buy the debt of the countries with troublesome debt burdens, just days after it said it would not engage in such purchases”.

This agreement [to aid troubled countries] raises questions about the independence of the ECB, thereby creating political obstacles to the conduct of good monetary policy in the future.

Buying the distressed debt of some countries is not monetary policy as conventionally defined, but rather an effort to allocate funds to some creditors and borrowers and not others. Unlike a central bank’s responsibility to provide for price stability and thereby economic growth, there is no established rationale that such credit allocation policy should be the responsibility of an independent agency of government. Most likely the purchases will be financed by money creation – quantitative easing – as the ECB expands its balance sheet. If Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, is right that the ECB will not increase the money supply, then it will have to sell other governments’ securities to offset the purchases of Greek debt. This will further increase the tax burden for citizens of those other countries. Of course, Ms Merkel’s comment about how the ECB should set the money supply is another indicator of reduced independence.

John Taylor, “Central banks are losing credibility”, Financial Times, 12 May 2010.

Professor John Taylor (1946-) is an expert on monetary-policy and senior fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. He is well-known for proposing, in a 1993 paper, the Taylor Rule for central banks on how to determine interest rates. His home page has links to his blog and to numerous papers, including an ungated version of this May 12th op-ed.

debt crisis and the euro project

Wednesday, May 12th, 2010

The always sensible Martin Wolf has drafted another superb column on the euro crisis. The massive rescue package cobbled together last Sunday night reminds Martin of the response of governments to market panic in the autumn of 2008.

Will the plan work? On the assumption that it is ratified, the answer should be yes, as markets concluded. It greatly increases the cost of betting against the debt of weak governments. The public debt of the eurozone is slightly lower than that of the US, relative to gross domestic product. If the creditworthy governments decide to support the less creditworthy ones, they can do so, for now.

Why has such radical intervention been found necessary? It is, after all, hardly what the designers [of the euro] had in mind. This is where we need to go back to the beginning of the project for a currency union. It rested on three central assumptions: first, treaty-defined limits would constrain fiscal deficits of members; second, to the extent that this failed, the “no bail-out” clause would constrain them; and, third, member economies would converge over time. Alas, none of this has proved to be true. ….

So where do we go from here? We must start by recognising that all we have done is buy a little time. …. [Now we] confront big choices.

The first and most fundamental is whether to go towards greater integration or towards disintegration. The answer has to be the former. Of course, it is possible to imagine a return to national currencies. But this would cause the financial system to implode, since the relations between assets and liabilities now in euros would become so uncertain. There would be massive capital flight into the banks of those countries deemed safe.

Martin Wolf, “Governments up the stakes in their fight with markets”, Financial Times, 12 May 2010.

On the subject of EU integration, Martin mentions an “interesting idea, from the Brussels-based think-tank, Bruegel, is that eurozone countries should pool up to 60 per cent of GDP of their national debts, thereby creating one of the world’s two largest public debt markets”.

The expectation is that average borrowing costs would be reduced for the pooled portion of the debt (Blue debt, issued as euro bonds). The no-bailout clause would be limited to debt in excess of 60% of GDP (Red debt, issued as national bonds). The default risk would be much higher for Red bonds than for Blue bonds.

[T]he [marginal] cost of borrowing should be increased for a country on a reckless borrowing path by disentangling sovereign debt responsibilities within the euro area to the extent that the no-bailout clause becomes credible not only de jure (which it is) but also de facto, which presently is not the case as recent events show.

Jacques Delpla and Jakob von Weizsäcker “The Blue Bond Proposal”, Bruegel Policy Brief 210/3 (6 May 2010).

California is not Greece

Wednesday, May 12th, 2010

Economists Carmen Reinhart, Yves Smith and Simon Johnson are answering selected readers’ questions on the euro crisis over at Economix. I especially liked the following question, and the answer provided by Simon Johnson:

How is the state of California any different than Greece? — CraigA, Los Angeles

Simon Johnson: Greece has been able to issue a great deal of debt — and run a big budget deficit — because European banks did not think it was dangerous to lend to a euro zone member country. This expectation has now been validated in large part by the bailout measures put in place over the weekend.

In contrast, the federal government does not stand behind California — at least, that is what most people think. This puts more of a limit on what California can borrow. California can still have a fiscal crisis, but this will have different consequences from what is happening in Greece — and (hopefully) will not, even in a very negative scenario, contribute to financial contagion.

Economix Editors, “More Answers on Europe’s Debt Crisis”, 11 May 2010.

The responses of Carmen Reinhart and Yves Smith to this question are also concise and interesting.

There are three instalments of questions and answers. The other two are here and here.

Some of the questions are challenging. Bob Davis of Washington, for example, in the third set of questions asks “Why do we rely on economists at all? …. Please tell me any advantage to the study of economics or the advice of economists.” Simon Johnson responds with exceptional frankness and humility: “I agree that much of economics has proved worse than useless — actually quite dangerous”. Yves Smith provides a lukewarm defence of economics and economists. Carmen Reinhart did not respond to this question.

consumers of education

Tuesday, May 11th, 2010

[Former teacher and educational researcher] Dr [Kevin] Eames says there has been a change in culture in recent years, which has turned pupils and students into consumers of educational services.

He adds: “If something goes wrong – it’s the teacher’s fault. If the exam results are not what are expected it is also the teacher’s fault.

“It’s this shift from pupils learning from someone who has the knowledge – to becoming consumers who are judging the providers of that knowledge – it’s like a beauty contest into ‘edutainment’,” he adds.

Hannah Richardson, “Why is teaching so stressful?”, BBC News, 30 April 2010.

Thanks to Chris Willmore for the pointer.

charities, non-profits and for-profit corporations

Monday, May 10th, 2010

GMU economist Russ Roberts regularly interviews academics (usually, but not always, economists) on topics of general interest. All the hour-long podcasts are archived and can be downloaded at econtalk.org or at iTunes. I particularly enjoyed a recent talk with Duke University economist Mike Munger that begins with a discussion of non-profit organizations. Are non-profits an alternative to for-profit companies, or are they an alternative to government? If a ‘non-profit’ sells goods and services, rather than giving them away, in what way is it a charity? How does this type of non-profit differ from a for-profit company? Charities, after all, traditionally rely on donations, not on income from sales of goods and services. I had never thought clearly about this issue before, so learned a lot from the podcast.

What motivates people, self-interest or altruism? Both obviously. But how do these forces interact with each other? Does relying on one always provide a stronger incentive than the other? Do charities, for-profit businesses or government agencies do a better job providing a good or service? Munger and Roberts have a wide-ranging discussion across these issues ….

Russ Roberts, “Munger on Love, Money, Profits, and Non-profits”, EconTalk, 19 April 2001.

Michael Munger teaches economics, political science and public policy at Duke University. He ran as candidate of the Libertarian Party in the 2008 election for Governor of North Carolina and lost, receiving less than 3% of the popular vote.

Samuel Brittan on Jagdish Bhagwati on financial folly

Saturday, May 8th, 2010

FT columnist Samuel Brittan now understands why Columbia University economist Jagdish Bhagwati, an outspoken proponent of free trade, has always opposed liberalisation of capital markets.

Despite the inevitable failure to implement the right kinds of intervention and the persistence of the wrong kind, there have been enormous benefits from economic liberalisation. …. The policy mistake, he [Bhagwati] argues, has been to “carry over the legitimate approbation of freer trade” and direct foreign investment “to the altogether more volatile financial sector, which represents the soft underbelly of capitalism”. He goes into detail about how this error was encouraged by the constant movement of senior figures between Wall Street and the US Treasury Department. I used to think that such statements by Prof Bhagwati represented mainly the natural frustrations of a highly regarded trade economist at all the attention being focused on financial issues. I think that no longer.

Samuel Brittan, “A credo for a revived capitalism”, Financial Times, 7 May 2010.

Ken Rogoff on crisis in the eurozone

Saturday, May 8th, 2010

Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff (1953-) explains why Greece is likely to default, followed by other indebted eurozone countries. The column was published on Thursday, but somehow I noticed it only today (Saturday).

Is it realistic for the IMF and Europe to hope that Greece (and other struggling euro members) will survive without an eventual default? It can happen but it is not easy. ….

Economists have only a limited understanding of why sovereign nations ever repay their external debt, given the lack of any supranational legal authority that might force them to do so. It is very rare for a country to default because it literally cannot pay. In most cases, and certainly in southern Europe today, the issue is willingness to pay. Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu famously forced his people to endure cold winters with minimal heat to help his country repay $9bn owed to foreign banks in the 1980s. Had he been able to wait a few years, Romania would probably have enjoyed the same kind of partial debt forgiveness extended to many others at the end of that decade. The fact that a country can repay its debt does not necessarily mean it should choose to do so.

In the case of Europe, the decision to repay involves not only the usual costs and benefits, but also the added question of how a nation’s status in the European Union will be affected. Is Europe prepared to go to great pains to punish Greece if it defaults, imposing costs much higher than those a non-euro country would face? If not, how can it seriously expect Greece to pay down debt levels far in excess of those navigated by almost any other large emerging market?

Kenneth Rogoff, “Europe finds the old rules still apply”, Financial Times, 6 May 2010.

There is much more in this ‘must read’ column. Professor Rogoff is co-author with Carmen Reinhart of This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton University Press, 2009). His recent papers can be downloaded here.

why The Economist is no longer worth reading

Friday, May 7th, 2010

It is a pity that The Economist, which used to be a sensible – indeed, excellent – newspaper, has fallen to such depths that I rarely read it. Here is a recent example, penned by “Buttonwood”:

It is a standard conservative argument that taxes on companies end up being taxes on everyone, since they will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. But of course, it works the other way round; cuts in benefits for the poor, on in public sector payrolls, lead to lower demand for the goods and services that companies produce.

Buttonwood, “Democratic deficit”, Buttonwood’s notebook, 5 May 2010.

The writer is author of The Economist‘s column on financial markets.

Buttonwood’s analysis is flawed and incomplete. Everyone – producers and consumers alike – benefits from the stimulus of tax cuts and government spending only in times of recession and high unemployment. In normal times the standard argument applies, although it is somewhat more complex than assumed by Buttonwood. A full explanation can be found in any basic textbook, such as Greg Mankiw’s popular Principles of Economics:

Who Pays the Corporate Income Tax?

The corporate income tax provides a good example of the importance of tax incidence for tax policy. The corporate tax is popular among voters. After all, corporations are not people. Voters are always eager to have their taxes reduced and have some impersonal corporation pick up the tab.

But before deciding that the corporate income tax is a good way for the government to raise revenue, we should consider who bears the burden of the corporate tax. This is a difficult question on which economists disagree, but one thing is certain: People pay all taxes. When the government levies a tax on a corporation, the corporation is more like a tax collector than a taxpayer. The burden of the tax ultimately falls on people—the owners, customers, or workers of the corporation.

Many economists believe that workers and customers bear much of the burden of the corporate income tax. To see why, consider an example. Suppose that the U.S. government decides to raise the tax on the income earned by car companies. At first, this tax hurts the owners of the car companies, who receive less profit. But over time, these owners will respond to the tax. Because producing cars is less profitable, they invest less in building new car factories. Instead, they invest their wealth in other ways—for example, by buying larger houses or by building factories in other industries or other countries. With fewer car factories, the supply of cars declines, as does the demand for autoworkers. Thus, a tax on corporations making cars causes the price of cars to rise and the wages of autoworkers to fall.

The corporate income tax shows how dangerous the flypaper theory of tax incidence can be. The corporate income tax is popular in part because it appears to be paid by rich corporations. Yet those who bear the ultimate burden of the tax—the customers and workers of corporations—are often not rich. If the true incidence of the corporate tax were more widely known, this tax might be less popular among voters.

“Corporate Tax Rates”, Greg Mankiw’s blog, 3 May 2006.

Mankiw is conservative, so readers might infer that this is a conservative argument. I don’t think so. If my memory is correct, a similar statement can be found in any principles text. I am travelling, so do not have easy access to textbooks, but if anyone doubts this, check out, for example, a text authored by two economists – Paul Krugman and Robin Wells – who are definitely not conservative. Chapter 7 of their book, Economics, is titled “Taxes”, so might be a good place to search. If you find any passage that differs from Mankiw’s statement, please let me know: comments are open!

capital flows and financial crisis

Wednesday, May 5th, 2010

Martin Wolf, at his FT Exchange, has begun another topic, one that has touched off a spirited debate.

The question I wish to pose for the next two weeks is whether it is possible for countries to accept large net inflows of capital from abroad, without ending up in crisis. If not, how do we manage a world of capital mobility?

This may seem a rather abstract problem. But I find it among the most important of all challenges confronting the world economy. It is the principal topic of my recent book, Fixing Global Finance (of which an updated edition has recently appeared). The view I have derived from the last three decades of experience is that it is almost an iron rule that, whenever countries run really large and sustained current account deficits (more than 5 per cent of GDP, or so), they end up in financial crisis. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff provide strong support for this view in their recent masterpiece, This Time is Different (Princeton University Press).

That is what happened to the Latin American countries in the debt crisis that erupted in 1982 and to the Asian countries in the crisis that erupted in 1997. It is also what happened in the current financial crisis ….

Martin Wolf, “Must large capital inflows always end in crisis?”, Martin Wolf’s Exchange, 4 May 2010.

The comments already are abundant, and most are interesting – well worth reading. Here is just one example:

Prior to the breakdown of Bretton Woods capital flows were regulated, current account imbalances occurred rarely and the type of unsustainable situation which we have now simply did not take place. Yes portfolio inflows are more unstable than FDI but Spain attracted investment in fixed assets (property) and still ran into trouble when the money inflows stopped. The property boom, followed by the massive bust has taken the economy with it. If we allow capital complete freedom then unfortunately we will become its slaves and not its masters. Current account deficits result in two things: either large foreign debt or ownership of the national economy by foreign entities. Neither has proved beneficial to the welfare of nations generally, unless you believe that colonialism was positive for the natives. I have my doubts about that.

Ivana Bottini

Outspoken economist Ivana Bottini blogs at fxtalks, when she is not writing letters to the editor, or participating in discussions like this one.

Greece and California compared

Wednesday, May 5th, 2010

There is a striking contrast between the European response to the Greek debt crisis and the US response to the Californian debt crisis.

In June 2009, the state of California handed employees IOU’s, so-called vouchers, for payment. ….

[Fear of costlier default] is reflected in the spreads on the credit default swaps on state bonds and the credit ratings of the bonds. The Californian economy is four times larger relative to the US than the Greek one is relative to the Eurozone. Yet nothing remotely resembling the concern and turmoil in Europe about Greece has occurred in the US regarding California.

…. Upon examination, it is difficult to explain this difference without invoking the self-inflicted damage of the doctrine that any default would be anathema for Eurozone.

Jacques Melitz, “Eurozone: Time for reform? A proposal”, VoxEU, 2 May 2010.

Jacques Melitz is a professor of economics at Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh.

He proposes that the Eurozone become more like the United States, and never bail out the taxpayers or creditors of member governments. “In the event of a Greek government default, the system would assure the stability of the Greek financial sector, and concern itself with any bank runs or bank failures in the country, but not with the Greek government’s difficulties.”

The proposal is a radical one, but it just might work. Details need to be fleshed out for Greece. For example, considerable government debt is held by commercial banks, so default could result in bank failures, not only in Greece, but also in France, Germany and other countries.