Archive for November, 2011

Martin Feldstein on the euro

Wednesday, November 30th, 2011

I rarely agree with Harvard economist Martin Feldstein, but his writings always make me think. His latest Project Syndicate column is no exception. The essay is not original, but it is didactic, and for this reason useful. Feldstein explains in clear language why some countries who adopted the euro are in difficulty, although he stops short of offering them advice on how to get out of the mess they find themselves in.

Feldstein argues that a common currency works well in the United States, but not in Europe, because of three characteristics of the American union. First, US labour is very mobile across state borders. Unemployed Americans move easily from states with high unemployment to states where jobs are plentiful. Second, the US has a centralized fiscal system, with automatic transfers to states in recession: “… each dollar of GDP decline in a state like Massachusetts or Ohio triggers changes in taxes and transfers that offset about 40 cents of that drop, providing a substantial fiscal stimulus”. Third, US states are required by law to balance their budgets. “Even a state like California, seen by many as a poster child for fiscal profligacy, now has an annual budget deficit of just 1% of its GDP and a general obligation debt of just 4% of GDP.”

None of these features of the US economy would develop in Europe even if the eurozone evolved into a more explicitly political union. ….

The most likely effect of strengthening political union in the eurozone would be to give Germany the power to control the other members’ budgets and prescribe changes in their taxes and spending. This formal transfer of sovereignty would only increase the tensions and conflicts that already exist between Germany and other EU countries.

Martin Feldstein, “Europe is Not the United States“, Project Syndicate, 29 November 2011.

I would add that Feldstein’s third point, which implies a ‘no bailout rule’, is the most important, and possibly a sufficient, explanation for currency union success. Panama, since it broke away from Colombia in 1904, has used the US dollar as its sole legal currency, albeit with the name ‘Balboa’. The government of Panama issues Balboa coins (of 50 cents or less value), but not paper notes, and has no political ties with the United States, other than treaties governing commercial trade and capital flows.

The list of independent countries that followed the example of Panama includes two Latin American countries (El Salvador and Ecuador), Zimbabwe in Africa, two small territories in the Caribbean (British Virgin Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands) and four in the South Pacific (East Timor, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau). None of them suffer from belonging to the US currency union, despite the fact that they do not enjoy free access to the US labour market, nor do they benefit from automatic fiscal injections in times of economic recession. One characteristic they share with US states, however, is the ‘no bailout rule’,

An important caveat: I am neither a macroeconomist nor an expert on finance, so I might be totally off base with these comments. Sometimes, though, it takes a non-specialist to see that the emperor is not wearing clothes!

the IMF and the eurozone

Wednesday, November 30th, 2011

The eurozone crisis threatens much of the world, even emerging economies. The International Monetary Fund cannot save the eurozone. But, Martin Wolf explains, the IMF can help by encouraging eurozone governments to choose policies that are ‘least bad’ for themselves and for the rest of the world.

What role can the IMF play? Not much of one. It lacks the firepower: its total uncommitted usable resources are only about $440bn. True, it might raise more money from interested outside countries. But it cannot hope to make up for the reluctance of the eurozone’s leading players to provide the support needed. Even if it had the resources, programmes for individual members would surely fail. ….

Now is the time for what John Maynard Keynes called “ruthless truth-telling”. And what is the truth that it [the IMF] should tell? It is that the eurozone has a choice between bad and calamitous alternatives. The bad alternative is radical policies to promote adjustment, while warding off a wave of sovereign debt restructurings, financial crises and a true depression. The calamitous alternative is that [of] depression, along with a break-up of the project. The IMF should speak up for the world’s interest in the less bad outcome. The eurozone alone can make the choice.

Martin Wolf, “What the IMF should tell Europe“, Financial Times, 30 November 2011.

Martin’s ‘calamitous alternative’, sadly, is a distinct possibility. Reflecting this is a headline story in today’s Financial Times: “Businesses plan for possible end of euro“.

time out

Tuesday, November 22nd, 2011

Tonight I fly to China, to visit Guangzhou, Zhongshan, Hong Kong and Macau. Expect no blogs before my return next Tuesday (November 29th).

means-testing old-age pensions in 1937

Monday, November 21st, 2011

I discovered some interesting information on old-age pensions at the time of their introduction in Norway. Two things surprised me. First, an important motivation apparently was to “increase the number of children in the families”. By providing cash benefits for the elderly, the state made it possible for adult children to divert expenditure from aged parents to their own young children. Second, an unwritten promise was that anyone, regardless of means, could obtain at least a portion of the supposedly means-tested benefit. If means-tests were not strictly applied, part of the benefit was effectively universal. In support of this conjecture, I would like to see statistics on the proportion of age-eligible Norwegians in receipt of partial (or full) age pensions in those years.

[In Norway during the decades of 1880-1920] there was mutual responsibility of support between grown children and parents, according to the poor relief legislation. This principle was weakened by the introduction of the old age pension in 1923 (which was not passed until 1937, with minor changes). An important motivation behind the act was the wish to increase the number of children in the families. Those with an occupation should use their income on their children rather than on their elderly parents. In order to stimulate such a development, the children’s income, from 1937, was no longer a factor in the appraisal of whether the over-seventies were entitled to their pensions or not. This was a breach of what had been viewed as the natural bonds of familial solidarity. It was a marked distinction from the poor relief system and put heavier emphasis on the nuclear family’s importance in society. In other areas as well, means testing was less severe than in the poor relief system, and the appraisals of need were not as haphazard.

Retirement pension also represented a shift from the Norwegian insurance system. For the first time previous wage labour was not a requirement for receiving benefit. Thus eligibility became largely divorced from work performance or other market participation. Entitlements were made independent of individual contributions since the financial responsibility was shifted onto public revenues. The principle of rightful means testing is adopted. Everyone had a right to receive benefit if certain economic conditions were met. An expressed premise was that the aged would receive a certain sum without any means test, to encourage them to find some income in addition.

Compared to that of other Scandinavian countries, the Norwegian retirement pension system was based more on the recipients’ rights than on testing their means of income. In principle, all old people were guaranteed a standard minimum amount with no conditions of previous wage labour or premium payment attached to it. However, two groups were excluded: those who had lived abroad and those who had been convicted of vagrancy, begging, drunkenness, and so forth.

Øyvind BjØrnson, “The Social Democrats and the Norwegian Welfare State: Some Perspectives“, Scandinavian Journal of History, 26:3 (2001), pp. 197-223.

To restrain costs, the Norwegian government initially set the age of eligibility at 70 years. The old-age pension became universal (without a means test) in 1959. Income tests were reinstated in 1969, and later reduced to tests of other pension income. Norway today, like Sweden, provides a Universal Minimum Pension to everyone who meets age and residence requirements. The age of eligibility was reduced (from 70 to 67 years) in 1973.

Hitler and Darwin

Sunday, November 20th, 2011

Astrophysicist Coel Hellier debunks the absurd, but common, accusation that Darwinian thinking inspired the Nazi holocaust.

[W]hile Nazi racial doctrine and Mein Kampf share one feature with Darwinism, namely competition and selection, the Nazi doctrine is not derived from Darwinism and is fundamentally incompatible with it. Whereas Darwinism says that all humans have a common origin, that species and races are malleable, evolving over time, and that one could (as with all animals, and if one so wished) artificially control breeding to enhance and select desired characteristics, Nazi doctrine says that human races are distinct and primordial, created separately by the Will of God, who desires that they remain separate, that the moral imperative is to preserve the races in their current state by preventing any racial intermixing, which would be both harmful and sinful.

Above all, while any similarity with Darwinism is only in one mechanism, namely competition and selection, the Nazi motivation for keeping the races separate is profoundly anti-Darwinian and instead religious and creationist. ….

Thus to the Nazis Darwinism was something they largely rejected and opposed. As with many Christians they opposed Darwinism because it saw man as an evolved ape, whereas they saw man as God’s special creation, and they opposed Darwinism because it was materialist, stripping mankind of the spiritual dimension, and because it did not give man a moralistic destiny.

That is why, in a list of books they banned from Third Reich libraries, the Nazis listed:

“Writings of a philosophical and social nature whose content deals with the false scientific enlightenment of primitive Darwinism and Monism (Haeckel).”

“Monism” is the idea that mankind is solely material, with no spiritual soul. Haeckel, as well as having been the foremost Darwinist in Germany, had founded the Monist League in 1905 (it was disbanded in 1933 when the Nazis gained power). The word “primitive” here is a pejorative epithet to denigrate Darwinism.

Coel Hellier, “Nazi racial ideology was religious, creationist and opposed to Darwinism“, coelsblog, 8 November 2011.

The essay is illustrated and carefully researched, with numerous quotes and links to historical documents.

Coel Hellier is professor of astrophysics at Keele University in England and author of Cataclysmic Variable Stars: How and why they vary (Springer-Verlag UK, 2001).

HT: The Browser.

a housing price bubble?

Saturday, November 19th, 2011

This TdJ from November 2003 reminds us that many economists – including Yale’s Robert Shiller and Wellesley College’s Karl Case – saw there was a housing bubble, long before prices crashed.

The Economist magazine continues to sound the alarm that there is a housing price bubble in many countries, including Britain and “large parts of America”. The short article in The Economist requires a subscription to view, but the authors draw on a much longer (61 page!) article by Robert Shiller and Karl Case, titled “Is there a Bubble in the Housing Market? An Analysis”. that can be downloaded at [new link].

While house prices have soared, rents have been fairly flat or have even fallen. In America, Britain and Spain the average net rental yield after maintenance and letting costs has dropped to 3-4%. This is less than mortgage rates, so many landlords are not covering their costs. No problem, retort many: we will make our profit from capital gains. This sounds ominously like an echo of the dotcom bubble, when it was argued that the old link between share prices and profits no longer mattered.

“Property prices: shaky foundations”, The Economist, 29 November 2003, p. 75.

Recycled from the 2003 TdJ archive.

financial literacy

Saturday, November 19th, 2011

Can you answer these questions? (The correct answers are here.)

1) Understanding of interest (numeracy)

Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow?

More than $102/ Exactly $102/ Less than $102/ Do not know/ Refuse to answer

2) Understanding of inflation

Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this account?

More than today/ Exactly the same/ Less than today/ Do not know/ Refuse to answer

3) Understanding of risk diversification

Please tell me whether this statement is true or false: “Buying a single company’s stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.”

True/ False/ Do not know/ Refuse to answer

These questions were selected for a representative survey of households in eight countries: Germany, the United States, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Russia, Japan, and New Zealand.

I found the questions trivially simple, and was surprised by the results reported for Germany.

Of over 1,000 German respondents, about 80% were able to correctly answer the interest question. More than three quarters gave a correct answer to the inflation question. However, only around 60% of respondents appear to understand the concept of risk diversification. Even though these are relatively simple questions, just over half of German respondents (53%) were able to correctly answer all three questions. …. About one in ten were unable to give any correct response and roughly four in ten chose “do not know/refuse to answer” at least once. While the level of financial literacy is low, German respondents have a level of financial literacy very similar to respondents in the US and the Netherlands. Given the complexity of financial decisions that individual face, these are worrisome findings. ….

Even 20 years after German unification, there are still fundamental differences between East and West. On average about 45% of East German compared to 58% of West German respondents were able to correctly answer all financial literacy questions. The regional disparity remains significant when demographic variables such as income, education, and wealth are taken into consideration.

Tabea Bucher-Koenen and Annamaria Lusardi, “Financial literacy and retirement planning: How well-prepared are German households?“, VoxEU, 19 November 2011.

Tabea Bucher-Koenen is Senior Researcher at the Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (Germany). Annamaria Lusardi is Professor of Economics and Accountancy at George Washington University (USA).

Nick Rowe on the euro

Friday, November 18th, 2011

Carleton University economist Nick Rowe finds eurozone news “really depressing” and thinks “things are going to be very bad very soon”.

Given the current ECB [European Central Bank] policy, what will be the value of the Euro, in terms of goods and services, in (say) two years time? What is the likelihood that it will be anywhere close to 4% (2 years x 2% inflation) less than it is today? Very small, in my opinion. If the crisis continues, but by some miracle the Eurozone hangs together, the most likely result will be deflation. If the Eurozone breaks up, many existing Euros will be converted into successor currencies that will depreciate. If the breakup is total, the Euro might even become worthless.

Under the existing ECB policy, I’m very uncertain about the future value of the Euro. I’m not even exactly sure how to define the question, when we start talking about successor currencies. If the ECB loosened monetary policy, and also acted as lender of last resort by making a public conditional commitment, the future value of the Euro would be much more predictable, and much closer to the inflation target.

Nick Rowe, “The ECB’s internal contradictions“, Worthwhile Canadian Initiative, 17 November 2011.

This is an excellent post, but I initially disagreed with one point. If the breakup is total, I thought, there is no possibility that the euro will become worthless. It will simply cease to exist as euros are converted into national currencies. Some successor currencies (Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland) will depreciate, but others (Germany, Austria, Finland, Netherlands) will probably appreciate. I couldn’t imagine all successor currencies depreciating together.

Then I thought, suppose the breakup is so messy that there are bank runs, with a flood of euros flowing, for example, from Greece to Germany. With this scenario, depreciation of all successor currencies might be possible.

the culture of economics

Thursday, November 17th, 2011

Economists essentially have a sophisticated lack of understanding of economics, especially macroeconomics. I know it sounds ridiculous. But the reason why I tell people they should study economics is not so they’ll know something at the end—because I don’t think we know much—but because we’re good at thinking. Economics teaches you to think things through. What you see a lot of times in economics is disdain for other’s lack of thinking. You have to think about the ramifications of policies in the short run, the medium run, and the long run. Economists think they’re good at doing that, but they’re good at doing that in the sense that they can write down a model that will help them think about it—not in terms of empirically knowing what the answers are. And we have gotten so enamored of thinking things through that the fact that we don’t know anything needs to bother us more. So, yes, it’s true that the average guy on the street doesn’t understand economics, and it’s also true that we don’t understand economics. We just have a more sophisticated lack of understanding than the guy on the street.

Culture in Economics and the Culture of Economics: Raquel Fernández in Conversation with The Straddler“, The Straddler, Fall 2011.

HT: The Browser

Raquel Fernández (PhD 1988, Columbia University) is professor of economics at New York University.

Sweden’s universal minimum pension

Wednesday, November 16th, 2011

Sweden in 1913 was the first nation in the world to implement what has been described as a “universal pension system”. The scheme was not fully universal, however. It guaranteed residents aged 67 and older only a minimum pension, a flat benefit reduced by the amount of other pension income. The conservative government of the day considered, and rejected, the idea of a universal pension with the same flat benefit for everyone. To this day, Sweden continues to provide its elderly a minimum pension rather than a universal pension.

The general pension insurance, thus established [in 1913], basically encompassed the entire population. Even those who were unable to work because of disability, or had already reached the age of 67, received a pension. The pension consisted of two parts:

1 A pension financed by the individual’s own contributions, which were based on his/her taxable income; the higher the income, the higher the contributions.

2 A tax-financed, income-based supplementary pension intended for those either not covered or not covered adequately by a pension of the first type. This pension aimed at removing elderly or disabled persons from poor relief.

In discussions and proposals leading up to the decision taken in 1913, … alternative models were considered. Two of them had little support and can be regarded as unrealistic. One involved a type of state-subsidized voluntary insurance. Experience had shown that few people selected voluntary insurance of this sort, and that those who did were scarcely those most in need of it. So pension insurance had to be compulsory. The other impractical model was a universal tax-financed pension with a flat rate. There was no financial basis sufficient in size for a pension of this sort and no country in the world had such a pension system.

Per Gunnar Edebalk & Mats Olsson, “Poor Relief, Taxes and the First Universal Pension Reform: the origin of the Swedish welfare state reconsidered“, Scandinavian Journal of History 35:4 (December 2010), pp. 398-399 (emphasis added).

The authors are professors at Lund University, Centre for Economic Demography. An earlier, ungated version of their paper is available here. (Scroll down to Mats Olsson.)

The argument that a universal pension was unaffordable seems strange, to me, for almost no-one in Sweden received an old-age pension before 1913. The cost of a universal pension would have been almost the same as the cost of a universal minimum pension of the same size.

So far as I have been able to determine, New Zealand was the first nation in the world to provide its elderly population with a universal pension. Legislation was passed in 1938, and benefits commenced in 1940. Other countries followed, including Canada, Australia, Mauritius  and Norway. Of this list, only New Zealand and Mauritius continue to have universal pensions.