Archive for the ‘Finance’ Category

the Treasury View of 1929

Saturday, April 14th, 2012

What most depresses me, as I read myriad comments on our current financial crisis, is to see that the Treasury View that Keynes fought against in the 1930s is still alive and well. This is the view that public spending displaces private investment, so cannot stimulate the economy. Via Brad DeLong, here is Joan Robinson’s recollection of the 1930s debate, which eerily resembles the debate we are witnessing now.

What was the state of orthodox opinion when the world was struck by the great slump? First of all, there was the famous Treasury View of 1929…. Lloyd George was campaigning for a policy of public works; Keynes with Hubert Henderson produced the pamphlet Can Lloyd George Do It?, which first adumbrated the theory of the multiplier and of the relation of saving to investment. To answer Lloyd George, the Conservative government produced a White Paper in which various ministers stated the case against spending money in their respective departments on housing, schools, roads, etc. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was Churchill; he could not bring himself a second time to defend deflation and sound finance. It was left to the officials to produce the argument for the Treasury. Their case was very simple. It was based on the idea that investment is governed by saving. If the government borrowed £100 million to spend on public works, there would be £100 million less for foreign investment. The surplus of exports would fall by a corresponding amount. There would be a transfer of employment but no change in the total. It is not fair to put much weight on this. The Treasury, after all, was required to say something and this was what they thought of to say. The fact that it appeared to be a respectable argument, however, certainly was a symptom of the state of opinion at that time….

The main orthodox reaction to the slump was the argument that wages were too high. This could be backed up by statistical argument. In those old days, prices used to fall when there was a decline in demand, so that prices were lower relatively to money-wage rates than when employment was higher. In a style of argument nowadays familiar in another context, a correlation was exhibited as a cause. The theory that unemployment could be due only to wages being too high received solid support from the evidence….

While the controversy about public works was developing, Professor Robbins sent to Vienna for a member of the Austrian school to provide a counter attraction to Keynes. I very well remember Hayek’s visit to Cambridge on his way to the London School. He expounded his theory and covered a black board with his triangles. The whole argument, as we could see later, consisted in confusing the current rate of investment with the total stock of capital goods, but we could not make it out at the time. The general tendency seemed to be to show that the slump was caused by [excessive] consumption. R. F. Kahn, who was at that time involved in explaining that the multiplier guaranteed that saving equals investment, asked in a puzzled tone, “Is it your view that if I went out tomorrow and bought a new overcoat, that would increase unemployment?”‘ “Yes,” said Hayek, “but,” pointing to his triangles on the board, “it would take a very long mathematical argument to explain why.”

This pitiful state of confusion was the first crisis of economic theory that I referred to…

Joan Robinson, “The Second Crisis of Economic Theory” (Richard T. Ely Lecture), American Economic Review 62:1/2 (March 1972), pp. 1-10.

Cambridge economist Joan Robinson (1903-1983) was a brilliant, original thinker, yet never received a Nobel Prize. Many, if not most, economists believe that the Swedish Royal Academy was biased against her. According to an anonymous biographer in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, this bias was not because she was a woman. “Rather, her political views became more left wing as she aged, to the point where she admired Mao Zedong’s China and Kim Il Sung’s North Korea. These extreme views should not have affected her chances of getting an award for her intellectual contributions, but they probably did.”

Joan Robinson previously appeared on TdJ here, as the second entry in the “economics as faith” series.

adjusting to crisis in the eurozone

Wednesday, April 11th, 2012

In the years of euphoria prior to the financial crisis, private capital flowed freely, not least into countries in southern Europe. Greece, Portugal and Spain ran current account deficits of 10 per cent of gross domestic product, or more. These financed huge excesses of spending over income in private sectors, public sectors, or both. These economic booms also generated large losses in external competitiveness.

Then came the “sudden stops” in private inflows. … [These] occurred during the global crisis of 2008 (affecting Greece and Ireland), in the spring of 2010 (affecting Greece, Ireland and Portugal) and, finally, in the second half of 2011 (affecting Italy, Portugal and Spain). In some cases, what happened went beyond a mere stop in inflows. Ireland, for example experienced large capital flight. Of course, when capital ceased to flow to the private sector, activity collapsed and the fiscal position worsened dramatically.

Martin Wolf, “Why the Bundesbank is wrong“, Financial Times, 11 April 2012.

Martin Wolf’s column today is  a ‘must read’. His main point is that adjustment will necessarily take place both in surplus (capital-exporting) and deficit (capital-importing) countries. He criticizes the president of the Bundesbank for confusing productivity with competitiveness. “These”, Martin writes, “are distinct: the US, for example, is more productive, but less competitive, than China. External competitiveness is relative.” Without adequate monetary and fiscal policies, Martin cautions that European economies will adjust very slowly, if at all, and suffer a prolonged period of weak demand and high unemployment.

This TdJ is only an overview, an introduction. Read the full column for details.

professional advice can be bad for your financial health

Tuesday, April 3rd, 2012

A study of advice given by financial advisers to investors in the Boston area confirms what I have always suspected: these people work hard to increase their own wealth, at your expense.

Do financial advisers undo or reinforce the behavioral biases and misconceptions of their clients? We use an audit methodology where trained auditors meet with financial advisers and present different types of portfolios. These portfolios reflect either biases that are in line with the financial interests of the advisers (e.g., returns-chasing portfolio) or run counter to their interests (e.g., a portfolio with company stock or very low-fee index funds). We document that advisers fail to de-bias their clients and often reinforce biases that are in their interests. Advisers encourage returns-chasing behavior and push for actively managed funds that have higher fees, even if the client starts with a well-diversified, low-fee portfolio.

Sendhil Mullainathan, Markus Noeth, Antoinette Schoar, “The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study“, NBER Working Paper No. 17929, March 2012.

The authors are from Harvard University, University of Hamburg and MIT, respectively. Ungated versions of the paper are available here and here.

multiple truths of the financial crisis

Thursday, March 29th, 2012

MIT economist Andrew Lo reviews 21 diverse books on the financial crisis. Eleven were written by academics, nine by journalists and one by former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. Here are the first two paragraphs of his review essay.

In Akira Kurosawa’s classic 1950 film Rashomon, an alleged rape and a murder are described in contradictory ways by four individuals who participated in various aspects of the crime. Despite the relatively clear set of facts presented by the different narrators—a woman’s loss of honor and her husband’s death—there is nothing clear about the interpretation of those facts. At the end of the film, we’re left with several mutually inconsistent narratives, none of which completely satisfies our need for redemption and closure. Although the movie won many awards, including an Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film in 1952, it was hardly a commercial success in the United States, with total U.S. earnings of $96,568 as of April 2010. This is no surprise; who wants to sit through 88 minutes of vivid story-telling only to be left wondering whodunit and why?

Six decades later, Kurosawa’s message of multiple truths couldn’t be more relevant as we sift through the wreckage of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Even the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission—a prestigious bipartisan committee of ten experts with subpoena power who deliberated for eighteen months, interviewed over 700 witnesses, and held nineteen days of public hearings—presented three different conclusions in its final report. Apparently, it’s complicated.

Andrew W. Lo, “Reading about the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book Review“, Journal of Economic Literature 50:1 (March 2012), pp. 151-178.

An ungated version is available here.

Andrew Lo is Professor of Finance at the MIT Sloan School of Management and director of MIT’s Laboratory for Financial Engineering.

deleveraging is not easy

Wednesday, March 14th, 2012

“Deleveraging”, writes Martin Wolf, is “an ugly word” for something that is needed after a financial bubble collapses. The term refers to a reduction in the amount of debt, which can only happen in two ways. The choice is between repayment and default.

One cannot get out of debt by taking on more debt. How often have you read such remarks? It is a cliché. …. [I]t is also false. ….

[A] temporary rise in fiscal deficits helps protect the economy from the forced private retrenchment. The alternative would be a depression, in which mass bankruptcy, not repayment, lowers debt. Unfortunately, the smooth adjustment path takes time. It also depends on the government’s creditworthiness, which has to be far better than that of the private sector. This has been true for the US and UK, but not Spain, which is being coerced into savage retrenchment. ….

[I]t is going to take quite a long time to escape the aftermath of the biggest financial crisis since the 1930s. The good news is that a depression was prevented. Further good news is that private sector deleveraging is progressing, especially in the US. As asset prices stabilise and the economies adjust, it should be possible to withdraw the exceptional monetary and fiscal support. The bad news is that this is likely to take longer than many expect. Premature withdrawal of monetary and fiscal support could push afflicted economies back into recession, with devastating effects on confidence. In the long run, moreover, big shifts in the external accounts will be necessary if a new round of irresponsible private borrowing or a continuation of huge fiscal deficits is to be avoided.

Martin Wolf, “A hard slog in the foothills of debt“, Financial Times, 14 March 2012.

humanizing finance

Friday, March 9th, 2012

An enlightened system of financial capitalism requires some government interventions, including a progressive income tax. There also needs to be a social safety net, and it has to be continually improved and reworked. ….

People aren’t inherently and uniformly loving to their neighbors, but our institutions can be changed to reward the better side of human nature.

One of these better sides is the charitable impulse, and the tendency, at least in the right social environment, for wealthy people to give much of their wealth away constructively. Such a tendency ought to be considered central to financial capitalism.

One other singularly important human impulse was emphasized by Adam Smith in his 1759 book, “The Theory of Moral Sentiments.” This is the desire for praise. We see this plainly in the behavior of the youngest children and the oldest and weakest people, those with no hope of attaining power over others.

Robert Shiller, “Logic of Finance Can Banish Corruption“, Bloomberg View, 7 March 2012.

HT The Browser

This is the last of 4 excerpts from Yale economist Robert Shiller’s new book Finance and the Good Society, to be published next month by Princeton University Press.

The other three excerpts can be accessed here and here and here.

China’s financial opening

Wednesday, February 29th, 2012

China has decided to accelerate opening of its capital account, a move that could produce another global financial crisis. This can be avoided, writes Martin Wolf, provided Chinese policymakers stick to their announced schedule of slow and cautious reform.

[The People's Bank of China last week laid out] three stages for reform. The first, to occur over the next three years, would clear the path for more Chinese investment abroad as “the shrinkage of western banks and companies has vacated space for Chinese investments” and so presented a “strategic opportunity”. The second phase, in between three and five years, would accelerate foreign lending of the renminbi. In the longer term, over five to 10 years, foreigners could invest in Chinese stocks, bonds and property. Free convertibility of the renminbi would be the “last step”, to be taken at an unspecified time. It would also be combined with restrictions on “speculative” capital flows and short-term foreign borrowing. In sum, full integration would be indefinitely delayed. ….

China’s gross savings are running at an annual rate of well over $3tn, which is more than 50 per cent larger than the gross savings of the US. Full integration of these vast flows is sure to have huge global effects. China’s financial institutions, already enormous, are also almost certain to become the biggest in the world over the next decade. One need only think back to Japan’s integration in the 1980s and subsequent financial implosion to recognise the possible dangers. We should be pleased, therefore, that China is taking a cautious approach.

Martin Wolf, “China is right to open up slowly“, Financial Times, 29 February 2012.

rescuing Greece and Portugal

Monday, February 13th, 2012

Wolfgang Münchau, an associate editor of the Financial Times, thinks that Greece and Portugal should be allowed to default and retain the euro, then rebuild their economies with the help of generous rescue funds.

Some say it would be better to force Greece out of the eurozone right now, and use the funds to save Portugal. I disagree. I personally believe it would be best to recognise the desolate state of both countries, let both default inside the monetary union, and then use a sufficiently increased rescue fund to help them to rebuild themselves, and to ringfence the rest at the same time.

This will be very expensive. But to ignore reality for another two years will be ruinous.

Wolfgang Münchau, “Why Greece and Portugal ought to go bankrupt“, Financial Times, 13 February 2012.

This approach may be politically feasible, but how can Greece and Portugal become competitive without national currencies to devalue? Mr Münchau does not mention this problem.

“catastrophic austerity” in Greece and in Weimar Germany

Wednesday, February 8th, 2012

The Financial Times has published an interchange of letters responding to a single sentence that Martin Wolf included in his column last week. The sentence, referring to German insistence on fiscal discipline in vulnerable eurozone countries, is the following.

This attempt to vindicate the catastrophic austerity of Heinrich Brüning, German chancellor in 1930-1932, is horrifying.

Martin Wolf, “Europe is stuck on life support“, Financial Times, 1 February 2012.

The first letter writer supports Martin’s view that austerity and deflation was the proximate cause of the fall of the Weimar Republic.

Monetarist fetishists have helped to circulate a pernicious falsehood that the Weimar über-inflation caused the rise of Hitler. The wild inflation storm occurred in 1924. The Weimar economy recovered from it. The Nazis came to power only in 1933, as an immediate consequence of the deflationary spiral that resulted from what Mr Wolf refers to aptly as the “catastrophic austerity” introduced by Brüning.

Greece is now suffering from policies of similarly “catastrophic austerity”.

Anthony Murray, “Catastrophic austerity not über inflation gave us Hitler“, Financial Times, 6 February 2012.

The second letter writer asserts that the hyperinflation of 1924 was more important than the deflation of 1930-32 in ushering the Nazis into power in 1933.

No matter whether austerity today is catastrophic or not, to call Heinrich Brüning’s policies “the real reason for Germany’s descent into Nazism” (Letters, February 6) is a gross exaggeration. Although Brüning’s measures were disastrous, they were not very different from what other countries pursued during the Depression, mostly without turning into dictatorships. Germany’s descent began much earlier. ….

While we cannot draw a straight line from hyperinflation to the Machtergreifung by the Nazis, it is evident that the Weimar Republic never gained the broad-based democratic legitimacy needed to survive the Depression intact. Hyperinflation played an important part in that by destroying the faith of the middle class in the new regime.

Mark S. Manger, “Genesis of Nazism predates Brüning“, Financial Times, 8 February 2012.

No doubt both hyperinflation and austerity played a role. I have limited knowledge of recent German history, but timing seems to indicate that austerity was a more important factor in destroying German democratic institutions.

defining ‘Keynesian’

Tuesday, February 7th, 2012

Jonathan Portes argues that the label ‘Keynesian’ has become politicised, resulting in sterile political debate and needlessly high levels of unemployment. He describes three definitions of ‘Keynesian’.

Definition 1 is ‘anyone who doesn’t believe the Treasury View’, the doctrine that it is impossible for fiscal policy to affect aggregate demand “because the government needs to get the extra money from somewhere, whether through taxes or borrowing”. Mr Portes used to believe this, but no longer does. Nor does anyone else, so everyone is a Keynesian by this definition.

Definition 2 is “someone who believes that as an empirical matter, fiscal policy does have a substantial impact on aggregate demand; in contrast to those who believe that ‘Ricardian equivalence’ means that changes to government spending and borrowing will be substantially or wholly offset by changes to private sector spending and saving”.

Definition 3

So under Definitions 1 and 2 I’m a Keynesian, but then so is pretty much everyone else whom one would take seriously. The final definition, then, of a Keynesian, appears to be a much more ‘political’ one – someone who thinks that slowing fiscal consolidation would be a sensible policy decision in the current UK (or US) economic context. But this definition seems to me to be misconceived ….

[T]he main argument between those of us who favour slowing fiscal consolidation in the UK and those who think that this would be a dangerous mistake is not about whether the direct impact would be positive. It is whether the price of this direct positive impact would be ‘credibility’ with financial markets, and hence a damaging rise in long-term interest rates that would more than offset the gains.

I think this risk is hugely exaggerated, … but … this debate really has nothing to do with Keynes at all. It’s about a lot of things – how policymakers should deal with potential market irrationality, the role of the credit rating agencies, multiple equilibria, etc. But I don’t see that taking one side or the other of these arguments makes you a Keynesian (or not).

Jonathan Portes, “Fiscal policy: What does ‘Keynesian’ mean?“, Vox EU, 7 February 2012.

Jonathan Portes (born 1966) is director of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, a London-based, independent research institute.