Posts Tagged ‘Greg Mankiw’

‘sin’ taxes

Sunday, June 6th, 2010

Harvard economist Greg Mankiw explores the pros and cons of paternalistic governance.

Taxing soda may encourage better nutrition and benefit our future selves. But so could taxing candy, ice cream and fried foods. Subsidizing broccoli, gym memberships and dental floss comes next. Taxing mindless television shows and subsidizing serious literature cannot be far behind.

Even as adults, we sometimes wish for parents to be looking over our shoulders and guiding us to the right decisions. The question is, do you trust the government enough to appoint it your guardian?

N. Gregory Mankiw, “Economic View: Can a Soda Tax Save Us From Ourselves?”, New York Times, 6 June 2010.

why The Economist is no longer worth reading

Friday, May 7th, 2010

It is a pity that The Economist, which used to be a sensible – indeed, excellent – newspaper, has fallen to such depths that I rarely read it. Here is a recent example, penned by “Buttonwood”:

It is a standard conservative argument that taxes on companies end up being taxes on everyone, since they will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. But of course, it works the other way round; cuts in benefits for the poor, on in public sector payrolls, lead to lower demand for the goods and services that companies produce.

Buttonwood, “Democratic deficit”, Buttonwood’s notebook, 5 May 2010.

The writer is author of The Economist‘s column on financial markets.

Buttonwood’s analysis is flawed and incomplete. Everyone – producers and consumers alike – benefits from the stimulus of tax cuts and government spending only in times of recession and high unemployment. In normal times the standard argument applies, although it is somewhat more complex than assumed by Buttonwood. A full explanation can be found in any basic textbook, such as Greg Mankiw’s popular Principles of Economics:

Who Pays the Corporate Income Tax?

The corporate income tax provides a good example of the importance of tax incidence for tax policy. The corporate tax is popular among voters. After all, corporations are not people. Voters are always eager to have their taxes reduced and have some impersonal corporation pick up the tab.

But before deciding that the corporate income tax is a good way for the government to raise revenue, we should consider who bears the burden of the corporate tax. This is a difficult question on which economists disagree, but one thing is certain: People pay all taxes. When the government levies a tax on a corporation, the corporation is more like a tax collector than a taxpayer. The burden of the tax ultimately falls on people—the owners, customers, or workers of the corporation.

Many economists believe that workers and customers bear much of the burden of the corporate income tax. To see why, consider an example. Suppose that the U.S. government decides to raise the tax on the income earned by car companies. At first, this tax hurts the owners of the car companies, who receive less profit. But over time, these owners will respond to the tax. Because producing cars is less profitable, they invest less in building new car factories. Instead, they invest their wealth in other ways—for example, by buying larger houses or by building factories in other industries or other countries. With fewer car factories, the supply of cars declines, as does the demand for autoworkers. Thus, a tax on corporations making cars causes the price of cars to rise and the wages of autoworkers to fall.

The corporate income tax shows how dangerous the flypaper theory of tax incidence can be. The corporate income tax is popular in part because it appears to be paid by rich corporations. Yet those who bear the ultimate burden of the tax—the customers and workers of corporations—are often not rich. If the true incidence of the corporate tax were more widely known, this tax might be less popular among voters.

“Corporate Tax Rates”, Greg Mankiw’s blog, 3 May 2006.

Mankiw is conservative, so readers might infer that this is a conservative argument. I don’t think so. If my memory is correct, a similar statement can be found in any principles text. I am travelling, so do not have easy access to textbooks, but if anyone doubts this, check out, for example, a text authored by two economists – Paul Krugman and Robin Wells – who are definitely not conservative. Chapter 7 of their book, Economics, is titled “Taxes”, so might be a good place to search. If you find any passage that differs from Mankiw’s statement, please let me know: comments are open!

Greg Mankiw on “spreading the wealth around”

Saturday, February 27th, 2010

Harvard economist Greg Mankiw has written a new paper, one inspired by candidate Barack Obama’s response to a question posed by “Joe the Plumber” during the presidential campaign of 2008. Joe asked then-Senator Obama about his proposal to raise taxes on high-income households by letting GW Bush’s tax-cuts expire. The candidate responded, in part, “It’s not that I want to punish your success. I just want to make sure that everybody who is behind you, that they’ve got a chance at success, too…. I think when you spread the wealth around, it’s good for everybody.”

I don’t think it is an exaggeration to say that the single most important difference between the political left and the political right is over the questions of whether, and to what extent, “spreading the wealth around” is a proper function of government.

Looking ahead, I fully expect the issue to remain at the center of political debate. One reason is that the tax cuts signed into law by President Bush in 2001 and 2003 will expire next year unless Congress takes action to extend them.

Another, perhaps more important, reason is that the U.S. federal government is running a large budget deficit and faces an ominous fiscal gap looming on the horizon. As the baby boom generation retires and starts claiming Social Security and Medicare, government spending will slowly and steadily continue to rise as a share of the economy. It is possible that Congress will suddenly read Milton Friedman’s book Capitalism and Freedom, become committed classical liberals (in the 19th century use the term), and decide to scale back the size and scope of government. But, more likely, Congress will find past entitlement promises hard to break, and so it will have little choice but to raise taxes to levels unprecedented in U.S. history.

Which naturally raises the question: Whose taxes should go up?

N. Gregory Mankiw, “Spreading the Wealth Around: Reflections Inspired by Joe the Plumber”, February 2010.

Professor Mankiw, who chaired GW Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers, shares his former boss’s view that wealthy citizens ought to be taxed lightly. This follows from what Mankiw calls the “Just Deserts Theory” of optimal taxation:

Under a standard set of assumptions, a competitive economy leads to an efficient allocation of resources. But we economists often say that there is nothing particular equitable about that equilibrium. Perhaps we are too hasty in reaching that judgment. After all, it is also a standard result that in a competitive equilibrium, the factors of production are paid the value of their marginal product. That is, each person’s income reflects the value of what he contributed to society’s production of goods and services. One might easily conclude that, under these idealized conditions, each person receives his just deserts.

N. Gregory Mankiw, “Spreading the Wealth Around”.

This a good paper and, as one might expect from the author of a best-selling economics text, very didactic. But it gives a false impression of 19th-century liberals. Mankiw implies that classical liberals opposed taxing the wealthy for the purpose of aiding those less fortunate. This is not true. Adam Smith, who famously wrote “Great nations are never impoverished by private, though they sometimes are by public prodigality and misconduct.”, has impeccable liberal credentials. Yet he supported progressive taxation and redistribution of income, as the following quotes show:

No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged.

Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776), Book I, Chapter 8, paragraph 35.

It is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public expence, not only in proportion to their revenue, but something more than in that proportion.

Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776), Book V, Chapter 2, paragraph 71.

In all fairness, I should point out that Mankiw does allocate space to the concerns of Adam Smith:

As long as people care about others to some degree, then antipoverty programs are a type of public good. That is, under this view, the government provides for the poor not simply because their marginal utility is high but because we have interdependent utility functions. Put differently, we would all like to alleviate poverty. But because we would prefer to have someone else pick up the tab, private charity can’t do the job. Government-run antipoverty programs solve the free-rider problem among the altruistic well-to-do.

N. Gregory Mankiw, “Spreading the Wealth Around”.

But Mankiw does not atribute this to Adam Smith, nor does he develop the line of thought fully. My concern is that a casual reader might miss this nuance, focus on the disproportionate space allocated to “Just Deserts Theory”, and fail to question, for example, whether large bonuses are “just deserts” for managers whose failing firms have been bailed out by taxpayers.

Bottom line: this excellent paper is worth reading, but beware of political bias.

taxing the deceased

Sunday, January 3rd, 2010

In the USA, thanks to GW Bush, the federal government no longer levies taxes on the estates of deceased citizens. Wealthy citizens who die in the years to come, beginning in 2011, will again face post-mortem taxes, with marginal rates as high as 55%.

Princeton economist Paul Krugman supports reinstatement of estate taxes.  Harvard economist Greg Mankiw favours their permanent repeal, for two reasons:

[First, although] the tax is levied only on the largest 2 percent of estates … [, it is not true] that the burden of the tax falls only on the richest 2 percent of Americans. …. As a first approximation, it would make more sense to distribute the burden of the tax to the estate’s beneficiaries rather than to the decedent.

What would happen if we allocated the estate tax burden to heirs rather than decedents? At first blush, one might think that it would not make much difference. After all, are not the children of rich people rich?

It turns out that the answer is “not always.” ….

[Second,] the estate tax unfairly punishes frugality, undermines economic growth, reduces real wages, and raises little, if any, federal revenue. There are no principles of good tax policy that support this tax, and I support the President’s call for its permanent repeal.

N. Gregory Mankiw, “Remarks at the National Bureau of Economic Research Tax Policy and the Economy Meeting”, National Press Club, 4 November 2003.

Professor Mankiw was Chairman of GW Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers at the time he made this statement.

For what it’s worth, I side with Krugman in this debate. Mankiw makes a valiant effort to support the estate tax, but I find his arguments flawed. In the case of tax incidence, Mankiw ignores the fact that the first million dollars of an estate are exempt from tax. If the heirs are not rich before receiving such an inheritance, they most certainly are after the fact. And, if Mankiw feels that a million dollars spread among children, grandchildren, nieces and nephews might leave some of them in poverty, then he ought to call for a larger exempt amount, or for an exempt amount for each beneficiary, not for repeal of the entire tax.

As for the effect of the estate tax on saving (NOT on investment, which is a separate issue), this is an argument for replacement of the income tax with a consumption tax – NOT for repeal of the estate tax. I, for one, favour exempting ALL saving from taxes, along with repeal of the estate tax, with one proviso: the accumulated savings (wealth) of an individual ought to be deemed ‘consumption’ upon death, and taxed accordingly. Alternatively, estates of the deceased could be taxed as income in the hands of beneficiaries. Professor Mankiw, alas, calls for abolishment of the estate tax but does not condition this on further tax reform.

Addendum: As a ‘small l’ liberal and follower of John Stuart Mill, I of course support the estate tax. Mill recommended in 1848 that government limit “the sum which any one person may acquire by gift or inheritance, to the amount sufficient to constitute a moderate independence”. For large estates, this implies a marginal tax of 100%!

Those concerned with high rates of taxation of wealthy dead individuals should – I believe – show at least equal concern with the even higher rates of taxation of incomes of the working poor. But they rarely do, with the notable exception of Greg Mankiw. Remember, marginal rates of taxation of low incomes often exceed 100%!

the tragedy of means tests

Monday, November 16th, 2009

Greg Mankiw is one of a handful of economists who worry about the effect of means tests on the welfare of the poor. Some time ago, he  posted a quote of “Kennedy School economist Jeff Liebman (via Jeff Frankel’s new blog) [who] tells a sad story about the incentive effects of government programs aimed at helping the poor”:

the poverty trap is still very much a reality in the U.S. A woman called me out of the blue last week and told me her self-sufficiency counselor had suggested she get in touch with me. She had moved from a $25,000 a year job to a $35,000 a year job, and suddenly she couldn’t make ends meet any more. I told her I didn’t know what I could do for her, but agreed to meet with her. She showed me all her pay stubs etc. She really did come out behind by several hundred dollars a month. She lost free health insurance and instead had to pay $230 a month for her employer-provided health insurance. Her rent associated with her section 8 voucher went up by 30% of the income gain (which is the rule). She lost the ($280 a month) subsidized child care voucher she had for after-school care for her child. She lost around $1600 a year of the EITC. She paid payroll tax on the additional income. Finally, the new job was in Boston, and she lived in a suburb. So now she has $300 a month of additional gas and parking charges. She asked me if she should go back to earning $25,000.

Greg Mankiw, “The Poverty Trap”, 10 February 2008.

Jeffrey Liebman is now Executive Associate Director of Obama’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

More recently, Mankiw linked to work by Boston University economists Kotlikoff and Rapson, who give the tax-transfer system of the US very low marks:

America’s tax-transfer system confronts the vast majority of American households with either high, very high, or astronomically high total effective marginal tax rates on labor supply and saving. It also provides very substantial tax arbitrage opportunities to a subset of households, particularly those with high incomes or advanced ages.

The pattern of net marginal tax rates and arbitrage opportunities with respect to age, marital status, and earnings is quite simply all over the map. But this is what one would expect given the amazing complexity of the fiscal system, the fact that the various components of the system are being developed with little or no thought to their interaction, and that the various governmental bodies responsible for the different elements of our tax-transfer system appear to make little or no attempt to understand the overall work and saving disincentives as well as arbitrage opportunities they are producing.

Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David Rapson, “Does It Pay, at the Margin, to Work and Save? — Measuring Effective Marginal Taxes on Americans’ Labor Supply and Saving”, Boston University, October 2006.

For reasons that I do not fully understand, political conservatives like Mankiw frequently fail to draw the obvious conclusion that universal benefits trump targeted transfers. The unwritten implication is the poor would be better off without transfers, but with their work incentives intact. Where are the ‘compassionate conservatives’?

health insurance and implicit taxes

Sunday, November 1st, 2009

Greg Mankiw today complains, like Tyler Cowen last week, that the proposed US health care reform bill contains income-tested subsidies that implicitly tax the incomes of the poor.

[Under President Obama's] policies, the largest increases in marginal tax rates may well apply not to the rich but to millions of middle-class families. These increases would not show up explicitly in the tax code but, rather, implicitly as part of health care reform. ….A family of four with an income, say, of $54,000 would pay $9,900 for health care. That covers only about half the actual cost. ….Now suppose that the same family earns an additional $12,000. …. In that case, the federal subsidy shrinks, so the family’s cost of health care rises to $12,700.

In other words, $2,800 of the $12,000 of extra income, or 23 percent, would be effectively taxed away by the government’s new health care system.

That implicit marginal tax rate of 23 percent … comes on top of the explicit marginal tax rate the family already faces from income and payroll taxes.

N. Gregory Mankiw, “Economic View: Supply-Side Ideas, Turned Upside Down”, New York Times, 1 November 2009.

On his blog, Mankiw explains that this is one “representative” example. Implicit tax rates are much higher for families with less income, for example 34% for a family of four with an income between $42,000 and $54,000, and higher yet for those with lower incomes.

What are the alternatives to the proposed reform? One option is to do nothing, leaving millions without health insurance. Another option is to fund universal health insurance from general government revenue. Mankiw cautions that this option is costly: “If large health insurance subsidies were offered to all Americans, regardless of income, the program’s cost would be exorbitant, requiring substantial increases in explicit taxes.”

But the cost of basic health insurance, spread over all taxpayers, would surely require less than a 23 percentage-point increase in explicit taxes on income. Another alternative is to finance health care with a national sales or value-added tax. This earmarked tax would have the advantage of taxing consumption, not savings. It is also a tax paid by everyone, rich and poor alike.

Income-tested subsidies – means tests – are implicit taxes on incomes of the working poor, which discourage them from working harder. Mankiw is right to emphasize the work incentives of explicit and implicit taxes. With this in mind, someone ought to take a close look at alternative ways to finance universal health care in the US.

Mankiw on unequal provision of health care

Sunday, September 20th, 2009

Harvard economist Greg Mankiw, in today’s New York Times, offers an interesting thought experiment. “Imagine that someone invented a … Dorian Gray pill …. Every day that you take the Dorian Gray, you will not die, get sick, or even age. Absolutely guaranteed. The catch? A year’s supply costs $150,000.”

So here is the hard question: How should we, as a society, decide who gets the benefits of this medical breakthrough? Are we going to be health care egalitarians and try to prohibit Bill Gates from using his wealth to outlive Joe Sixpack? Or are we going to learn to live (and die) with vast differences in health outcomes? Is there a middle way? ….

The push for universal coverage is based on the appealing premise that everyone should have access to the best health care possible whenever they need it. That soft-hearted aspiration, however, runs into the hardheaded reality that state-of-the-art health care is increasingly expensive. At some point, someone in the system has to say there are some things we will not pay for. The big question is, who? The government? Insurance companies? Or consumers themselves? And should the answer necessarily be the same for everyone?

N. Gregory Mankiw, “Economic View: Why Health Care Will Never Be Equal”, New York Times, 20 September 2009.

Greg Mankiw is correct: health care will never be the same for everyone. But he is wrong to assert that universal coverage means provision of “the best health care possible”. Private insurers and governments alike refuse to pay for some procedures either because they are not cost-effective or because they are cosmetic. Even in countries with universal health coverage, citizens have the option of paying privately for any health care they desire. Ten percent of UK residents, for example, have private health insurance that allows them to go to private clinics rather than the National Health Service. Canada is a glaring exception to this rule, but for most Canadians the US border and private payment is a short drive away.

What universal coverage means is that basic health care is provided to all residents, regardless of income. Each society has to decide what is meant by “basic care”, which determines in turn the amount of public money spent on health care.

A good analogy is schooling. Governments typically provide universal schooling, at least through high school. Parents who want their children to consume a better – or different – type of schooling are free to pay fees in an independent school of their choice. Bill Gates is not forced to send his children to public school. Similarly, no one would force Bill Gates to limit his consumption of health care to that provided by Medicare from age 65 or by a similar universal system for all ages.

The case for universal health care, like the case for universal schooling, is that differences in outcomes can be mitigated–not eliminated, which is an impossible goal.

HT to Greg Mankiw.