Posts Tagged ‘growth’

institutions and economic development

Thursday, April 11th, 2013

“Institutions matter” has become a mantra of development economics. Economist John Kay finds this pithy advice to be unhelpful, because there is no blueprint of unique institutions that are necessary or sufficient for sustainable growth.

[T]o say institutions matter is to beg the question: which institutions? The conventional reply emphasises property rights and rule of law. This excludes the arbitrary rule of the mad dictator or the king who enjoys power by divine right – but provides little further guidance. ….

So when the Chinese ask how to establish the institutions to support a stable, prosperous economy, it is not enough to mumble: “Property rights and rule of law – go to Denmark and see.” There are many versions of the successful formula of lightly regulated capitalism and liberal democracy, each with its own challenges. While there are common principles, there is no blueprint that can be enshrined in a Washington consensus or proclaimed “the end of history”.

Nor is there an established blueprint for a transition from anarchy or traditional society to the institutions that today’s development economists understand matter. Hong Kong in the 19th century experienced one such transition – the importing of institutions from another jurisdiction with the support of the Royal Navy and a garrison of troops. But that model for the most part did not prove acceptable, or permanent, elsewhere. Its resilience in Hong Kong was the result of a unique context. Institutions matter – but perhaps histories matter even more. And while countries can learn from history, they cannot reproduce histories.

John Kay, “Prosperity requires more than rule of law“, Financial Times, 10 April 2013 (free access).


 

cross-sections are history

Friday, March 15th, 2013

Researchers often fail to confirm cross-section associations between income and a variable of interest when they examine changes in the same variables over time. This illustrates vividly the old truism “Correlation is not causation”.

USC economist Richard Easterlin (born 1926), in a new paper, explains. In 1974 Professor Easterlin highlighted an example of this problem, now known as the “Easterlin Paradox“, the observation that happiness and income are positively associated between countries (or individuals within a country), but are typically not related in time series data.

International cross-section regressions on real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita are widespread in the social sciences. Findings of significant associations between GDP per capita and a multitude of economic, social, and political variables are commonplace, and these results are often read as demonstrating the effect of economic growth on the variables under study. For variables integral to production and consumption, such as material living standards or the rural–urban distribution of employment, such inferences are plausible. But economic growth is often viewed also as the main force responsible for such outcomes as the expansion of schooling, improved health, increased life expectancy, fertility decline, women’s empowerment, the extension of political and civil rights, and the like.

Moreover, these cross-section relationships are often taken to be predictive of time-series change, of what is likely to happen as a result of economic growth. Studies of the historical experience of individual countries, however, frequently fail to confirm expectations based on cross-section relationships. As one moves outside the purely economic realm to social and political variables, this lack of confirmation of an association with GDP per capita is especially apparent. Why, then, do we often find a significant cross-section relationship if the implied causal connection is not confirmed by time-series analysis? The answer suggested here is that cross-sections register the results of history, not insights into likely experience.

To focus the discussion, take as a demographic example the international cross-section regression of life expectancy at birth … on GDP per capita …. This relationship is sometimes thought to demonstrate the causal impact of economic growth on life expectancy ….

[Easterlin goes on to reason that economic growth does not cause increases in life expectancy, despite the positive cross-section relationship. Technological change has a profound effect on both variables, but advances in health technology spread to countries more quickly than advances in production technology. The result is a positive correlation between per capita GDP and life expectancy in cross-sections, but not in time-series.]

Richard A. Easterlin, “Cross-Sections Are History“, Population and Development Review 38 (Supplement, February 2013), pp. 302–308.

There is free access to the entire supplement at the link above. This issue of Population and Development Review contains 21 essays that celebrate the departure of Hungarian economist Paul Demeny (born 1932) as editor of the journal that he founded. Professor Demeny graduated from the University of Budapest in 1955 and received a PhD in economics from Princeton University in 1961.

NB: On reading my brief summary above, I realize that the explanation is more complex, and is difficult to explain in a few words. If you are interested, I recommend that you read the full article.

 

 

 

income inequality

Monday, March 4th, 2013

Via Greg Mankiw, here is a fascinating 42-minute lecture by Berkeley economist Emmanuel Saez on “Income Inequality: Evidence and Policy Implications”.

You can access the lecture from Greg Mankiw’s blog or directly from YouTube.

The lecture is highly recommended. For further information, you can download and read a paper that Saez wrote with two co-authors (abstract follows):

This paper summarizes the main findings of a recent literature that has constructed top income shares time series over the long-run for more than 20 countries using income tax statistics. Top incomes represent a small share of the population but a very significant share of total income and total taxes paid. Hence, aggregate economic growth per capita and Gini inequality indexes are very sensitive to excluding or including top incomes. We discuss the estimation methods and issues that arise when constructing top income share series, including income definition and comparability over time and across countries, tax avoidance and tax evasion. We provide a summary of the key empirical findings. Most countries experience a dramatic drop in top income shares in the first part of the 20th century in general due to shocks to top capital incomes during the wars and depression shocks. Top income shares do not recover in the immediate post war decades. However, over the last 30 years, top income shares have increased substantially in English speaking countries and in India and China but not in continental Europe countries or Japan. This increase is due in part to an unprecedented surge in top wage incomes. As a result, wage income comprises a larger fraction of top incomes than in the past. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and empirical models that have been proposed to account for the facts and the main questions that remain open.

Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “Top Incomes in the Long Run of History“, NBER Working Paper No. 15408, October 2009. Published also in Journal of Economic Literature 49:1 (March 2011), pp. 3-71.

The underlying data, continously expanded and updated, are posted at “The World Top Incomes Database”, a new website by F. Alvaredo, T. Atkinson, T. Piketty and E. Saez.

Emmanuel Saez (born 1972; PhD MIT, 1999) is a French economist. In 2009 he received the John Bates Clark Medal, awarded annually by the American Economic Association to “that American economist under the age of forty who is judged to have made the most significant contribution to economic thought and knowledge”.

See also Emmanuel Saez’s unpublished paper, “Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States (Updated with 2009 an d 2010 estimates)“, 2 March 2012.

democracy and growth

Tuesday, February 26th, 2013

FT columnist Gideon Rachman last weekend read Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty, co-authored by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (Profile Books, 2012). The main thesis of the book is that western-style democracy is necessary for nations to achieve economic success. Mr Rachman points to the counter-example of China, which “appears to challenge the insistence of Messrs Acemoglu and Robinson that prosperity can be secured only by ‘inclusive’ economic institutions, rooted in political pluralism”.

I think that Why Nations Fail makes a strong case that, over the long term, there is a clear correlation between political freedom and economic success. But, in the US, a generalised attachment to liberty has somehow turned into an unquestioning veneration of the constitution that has become almost quasi-religious. ….

There is a similar problem in Europe, where the compulsion to pay homage to the European ideal stopped many politicians from asking hard, but necessary, questions ….

The Chinese system clearly has its own terrible flaws, including brutality and corrosive corruption. But it has also had the virtue of a radical pragmatism, captured in Deng Xiaoping’s maxim that “it doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice”. ….

There are many reasons why nations can fail. The complacent worship of a dysfunctional political system could be one of them.

Gideon Rachman, “West complacent over why nations fail“, Financial Times, 26 February 2013.

happiness in China

Tuesday, February 19th, 2013

This is an important piece of research – carefully done, and well worth reading.

China’s life satisfaction in the last two decades has largely followed the trajectory of the central and eastern European transition countries – a decline followed by a recovery, with a nil or declining trend over the period as a whole. There is no evidence of a marked increase in life satisfaction in China of the magnitude that might have been expected due to the enormous four-fold improvement in levels of per capita consumption. In its transition China has shifted from one of the most egalitarian countries in the distribution of life satisfaction to one of the least. Life satisfaction has declined markedly among the lowest income and least educated segments of the population, while rising somewhat among the upper socio-economic stratum.

The similarity of China’s experience to that of the European transition countries and particularly to its role model under communism, the Soviet Union, lends credence to the results. …. The factors shaping China’s life satisfaction appear to be essentially the same as in the European transition countries – the emergence and rise of substantial unemployment, dissolution of the social safety net, and growing income inequality. The fact that China’s life satisfaction failed to increase despite its differing output experience – a rapid increase versus the collapse and recovery of output in the European countries – suggests that employment and the social safety net are of critical importance in determining life satisfaction.

The one piece of evidence that seemingly does not fit China’s life satisfaction pattern is the growth of output. How is it possible, one may reasonably ask, for life satisfaction not to improve in the face of such a marked advance from very low initial living levels? In answer, it is pertinent to note the growing evidence of the importance of relative income comparisons and rising material aspirations in China that tend to negate the effect of rising income. These findings are consistent with the view common in the happiness literature that the growth in aspirations induced by rising income undercuts the increase in life satisfaction due to rising income itself.

Richard A. Easterlin, Robson Morgan, Malgorzata Switek and Fei Wang, “China’s Life Satisfaction, 1990–2010“, IZA Discussion Paper No. 7196, January 2013, pp. 16-18.

The charts below are reproduced from p. 24 of this paper (WVS=World Values Survey).

profile of Stanley Fischer

Sunday, February 17th, 2013

Greg Mankiw today links to a profile of Stanley Fischer (age 69), with the note “Stan was my PhD dissertation adviser”.

As governor of Israel’s central bank, Fischer is credited with saving Israel from the worst of the 2008 global recession, by devaluing sharply the Israeli Shekel:

If [Federal Reserve Chairman Ben] Bernanke halved the value of the dollar relative to, say, the Chinese yuan, that would dramatically increase U.S. exports and probably economic growth, too, but it would also wreak havoc with the global financial system. Every dollar-denominated asset in the world, including all manner of bonds, would plummet in value.

It’s less risky for small countries. There aren’t massive piles of shekels lying around in other countries the way there are with dollars and euros, and Fischer took advantage of that fact. On May 30, 2008, a dollar was worth about 3.2 shekels. On March 6, 2009, it was worth 4.2 shekels. In less than a year, Fischer had reduced the value of the shekel by about 25 percent — a massive devaluation.

It worked. Exports soared, and 2008’s trade deficit of $2 billion became 2009’s trade surplus of $5 billion. While other countries fell deeper into recession, Israel brushed its shoulders off.

Dylan Matthews, “Stan Fischer saved Israel’s economy. Can he save America’s?“, Wonkblog, 15 February 2013.

Fischer will soon replace Bernanke as head of the US central bank (known as “the Fed”). Many expect great things from Fischer, but at least one of his former students is not impressed:

Fischer was my professor for monetary economics, and his was one of the three signatures on my dissertation. He was a nice man and an impressive teacher, but I did not care for his course, which I thought was just typical MIT mathematical masturbation.

I think that Fischer’s influence on the economics profession was large and detrimental. A ridiculously high proportion of macroeconomics professors are descendants in some way of Fischer. He was their thesis adviser, or their adviser’s adviser, or their adviser’s adviser’s adviser, etc. The net result is a macroeconomics discipline dominated by mathematical technique, with relatively little thought about the real workings of the economy or whether measured national statistics actually correspond to theoretical macroeconomic variables.

Arnold Kling, “Profile of Stanley Fischer“, AskBlog, 17 February 2013.

Fischer’s performance as head of Israel’s central bank does not impress me. A chart that accompanies Mattews’ profile reveals that the fall in growth rates from peak to trough in Israel, following the onset of the 2008 Great Recession,  was precisely the same in Israel as it was in the United States – about 7 percentage points. The difference is that Israel fell from 7% growth, and the US from a more anaemic 2.5% rate of growth. Israel’s recovery has been slower than that of the US, relative to each country’s pre-crisis rates of growth. (See the chart reproduced below.)

happiness and economic growth

Saturday, February 16th, 2013

I must read these two papers co-authored and authored by University of Southern California economist Richard Easterlin. Here are the abstracts.

Despite its unprecedented growth in output per capita in the last two decades, China has essentially followed the life satisfaction trajectory of the central and eastern European transition countries – a U-shaped swing and a nil or declining trend. There is no evidence of an increase in life satisfaction of the magnitude that might have been expected to result from the fourfold improvement in the level of per capita consumption that has occurred. As in the European countries, in China the trend and U-shaped pattern appear to be related to a pronounced rise in unemployment followed by a mild decline, and an accompanying dissolution of the social safety net along with growing income inequality. The burden of worsening life satisfaction in China has fallen chiefly on the lowest socioeconomic groups. An initially highly egalitarian distribution of life satisfaction has been replaced by an increasingly unequal one, with decreasing life satisfaction in persons in the bottom third of the income distribution and increasing life satisfaction in those in the top third.

Richard A. Easterlin, Robson Morgan, Malgorzata Switek and others, “China’s Life Satisfaction, 1990–2010“, IZA Discussion Paper No. 7196, January 2013.

Long term trends in happiness and income are not related; short term fluctuations in happiness and income are positively associated. Evidence for this is found in time series data for developed countries, transition countries, and less developed countries, whether analyzed separately or pooled. Skeptics, who claim that the long term time series trend relationship is positive, are mistaking the short term association for the long term one, or are misguided by a statistical artifact. Some analysts assert that in less developed countries happiness and economic growth are positively related “up to some point,” beyond which the association tends to become nil, but time series data do not support this view. The most striking contradiction is China where, despite a fourfold multiplication in two decades in real GDP per capita from a low initial level, life satisfaction has not improved.

Richard A. Easterlin, “Happiness and Economic Growth: The Evidence“, IZA Discussion Paper No. 7187, January 2013.

recovery from the 2008 recession

Friday, November 9th, 2012

FT columnist Samuel Brittan looks at the numbers, and finds that Canada and the US lead the major developed countries in recovery from the Great Recession of 2008.

I have a table of the behaviour of the main industrial economies since their pre-recession peak of 2007-08. Taking both that recession and the recovery from it, Canada heads the list with a net gain of real gross domestic product of 4.1 per cent. The US comes next with 2.2 per cent, followed by Germany with 1.7 per cent. France is still 0.8 per cent behind its earlier peak and Japan is 1.9 per cent short. The UK is almost bottom of the class with a net fall of 3.1 per cent, a drop exceeded only by Italy among the G7 countries. ….

Because of Congressional Republican opposition, the economic stimulus has not been as large as Mr Obama would have liked. Even so, it is a pity he has not had a Treasury secretary who would have proclaimed the relative superiority of US policy from the rooftops, as Larry Summers, an earlier Democrat incumbent of this post, would have.

Samuel Brittan, “America must be doing something right“, Financial Times, 9 November 2012.

The Conservative government’s austerity measures so far have failed to restore investor confidence in Britain. Be forewarned. Austerity will continue until confidence returns!

Samuel Brittan’s past columns are posted here.

China’s economy: a symposium

Tuesday, November 6th, 2012

The Fall 2012 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives contains a symposium on “China’s Economy”. Here is the abstract of one of the papers, authored by University of Toronto economist Xiaodong Zhu.

The pace and scale of China’s economic transformation have no historical precedent. In 1978, China was one of the poorest countries in the world. The real per capita GDP in China was only one-fortieth of the U.S. level and one-tenth the Brazilian level. Since then, China’s real per capita GDP has grown at an average rate exceeding 8 percent per year. As a result, China’s real per capita GDP is now almost one-fifth the U.S. level and at the same level as Brazil. This rapid and sustained improvement in average living standard has occurred in a country with more than 20 percent of the world’s population so that China is now the second-largest economy in the world. I will begin by discussing briefly China’s historical growth performance from 1800 to 1950. I then present growth accounting results for the period from 1952 to 1978 and the period since 1978, decomposing the sources of growth into capital deepening, labor deepening, and productivity growth. But the main focus of this paper will be to examine the sources of growth since 1978, the year when China started economic reform. Perhaps surprisingly, given China’s well-documented sky-high rates of saving and investment, I will argue that China’s rapid growth over the last three decades has been driven by productivity growth rather than by capital investment. I also examine the contributions of sector-level productivity growth, and of resource reallocation across sectors and across firms within a sector, to aggregate productivity growth. Overall, gradual and persistent institutional change and policy reforms that have reduced distortions and improved economic incentives are the main reasons for the productivity growth.

Xiaodong Zhu,”Understanding China’s Growth: Past, Present, and Future“, Journal of Economic Perspectives 26:4 (Fall 2012), pp. 103-24.

Professor Xiaodong Zhu’s paper, and the remainder of this issue of the JEP can be viewed and downloaded at the link. There are four more papers in the China symposium. Here are the titles and authors:

  • The End of Cheap Chinese Labor (pp. 57-74), by Hongbin Li, Lei Li, Binzhen Wu and Yanyan Xiong
  • Labor Market Outcomes and Reforms in China (pp. 75-102), by Xin Meng
  • Aggregate Savings and External Imbalances in China (pp. 125-46, by Dennis Tao Yang
  • How Did China Take Off? (pp. 147-70), by Yasheng Huang

The Journal of Economic Perspectives (JEP) is published quarterly by the American Economic Association (AEA), which generously provides free access to current and past issues of the journal. Subscription or membership is not required to view and download any of the published papers. Articles in the JEP are less technical than those published in other AEA journals and are intended to be accessible to readers who have little or no training in economics.

small is not beautiful

Sunday, September 16th, 2012

Sub-Saharan Africa’s failure to slay the dragon of poverty is due to a logical flaw in its policies: the remedies to reduce poverty don’t address the causes. Poverty is caused by unemployment, owing to a scarcity of jobs that pay above bare subsistence, but grass-roots poverty alleviation measures are exclusively designed to make job-seekers more capable although no jobs are available. The ‘appropriate’ technologies of the grass roots movement that dominates anti-poverty policies are oriented towards consumption, ignoring production jobs. Poverty persists from low productivity in agriculture or outright landlessness. Irrigation and rural electrification are required to facilitate economic diversification into non-agricultural work. Yet irrigation and electrification require central political coordination and application of modern science and technology. Centralized decision-making is low on the agenda of the anti-poverty movement, with deep roots at the local level. To create employment requires capital investments to expand entrepreneurial opportunities and increase productive jobs. The most successful countries to grapple with poverty have ‘scaled up,’ not down; Big, not Small, is Beautiful. The statistical evidence for a large number of developing countries strongly supports the hypothesis of a trickle down effect, not a bottom up effect as the best way to beat poverty.

Alice H Amsden, “Grass Roots War on Poverty“, World Economic Review Vol 1 (2012), pp. 114-131. (free access)

MIT political economist Alice Amsden is best known for two books: Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (Oxford University Press, 1989) and The Rise of “The Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies (Oxford University Press, 2001). She died suddenly on March 15th, 2012, at the age of 68. Her thoughtful and provocative contribution to the development debate will be missed by many, myself included.