Posts Tagged ‘Larry Summers’

Summers defends bailouts

Sunday, April 14th, 2013

Harvard economist Larry Summers defends the bailout of large financial institutions in his mixed review of Brown University economist Mark Blyth’s polemic Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (OUP, 2013).

It is entirely legitimate to question whether the Icelandic approach to financial crisis, in which banks were allowed to fail, provides a reasonable model for Cyprus. It is not reasonable to ask whether it would have been availing for the US in 2008 or for Spain today. Instead, as the aftermath of Lehman’s collapse should have demonstrated, cascading failures put at risk the functioning of not just the whole financial sector, but major non-financial companies and a huge range of small and medium-sized businesses. To suggest firm commitment to the non-bailout of major institutions in Europe today is to court calamity.

It is true, as Blyth and many others have pointed out, that bailouts have unjustified beneficiaries. Yes. The fact that wars have unintended innocent victims is not usually taken as an argument against all wars. Equally, any judgment about bailouts must turn on a comparison of costs and benefits. If by bailing out an undeserving few, it is possible to limit a calamity that would otherwise engulf many, it is the right thing to do.

Lawrence Summers, “The end of the line“, Financial Times, 14 April 2013.

Larry Summers is a former US Treasury secretary and former president of Harvard University. He writes that Mark Blyth “is no two-handed economist. He pulls no punches in making the case against austerity.”

forecasting the state of the economy

Monday, March 26th, 2012

Economic forecasters divide into two groups. There are those who cannot know the future but think they can – and then there are those who recognise their inability to know the future.

Lawrence Summers, “How to ensure stimulus today, austerity tomorrow“, Financial Times, 26 March 2012.

Harvard economist Larry Summers (born 1954) was President Clinton’s Treasury Secretary from July 1999 to January 2001, and Director of President Obama’s National Economic Council from January 2009 to the end of 2010.

the path to a lost decade

Monday, June 13th, 2011

Harvard economist Larry Summers writes that decisive action averted Depression in 2008/2009 but warns that the current recession is turning into a lost decade.

Even with the 2008-2009 policy effort that successfully prevented financial collapse, the US is now halfway to a lost economic decade. In the past five years, our economy’s growth rate averaged less than one per cent a year, similar to Japan when its bubble burst. …. Reports suggest growth is slowing. ….

The central irony of financial crisis is that while it is caused by too much confidence, borrowing and lending, and spending, it is only resolved by increases in confidence, borrowing and lending, and spending. Unless and until this is done other policies, no matter how apparently appealing or effective in normal times, will be futile at best.

The fiscal debate must accept that the greatest threat to our creditworthiness is a sustained period of slow growth. Discussions about medium-term austerity need to be coupled with a focus on near-term growth. Without the payroll tax cuts and unemployment insurance negotiated last autumn we might now be looking at the possibility of a double dip. Substantial withdrawal of fiscal stimulus at the end of 2011 would be premature. Stimulus should be continued and indeed expanded by providing the payroll tax cut to employers as well as employees. Raising the share of payroll from 2 per cent to 3 per cent is desirable, too. These measures raise the prospect of sizeable improvement in economic performance over the next few years.

At the same time we should recognise that it is a false economy to defer infrastructure maintenance and replacement, and take advantage of a moment when 10-year interest rates are below 3 per cent and construction unemployment approaches 20 per cent to expand infrastructure investment.

Lawrence Summers, “How to avoid our own lost decade“, Financial Times, 13 June 2011.

There is nothing new here, but the essay is didactic and well phrased. Lawrence Summers (born 1954) was President Clinton’s Treasury Secretary from July 1999 to January 2001, and Director of President Obama’s National Economic Council from January 2009 to the end of 2010. He is now an FT contributing editor, so we can look forward to more columns from him.

stimulus vs austerity

Monday, July 19th, 2010

Over the next week some of the world’s leading policymakers and economists will be addressing in the FT the all-consuming contemporary economic debate: austerity versus stimulus. The writers, including Larry Summers, Jean-Claude Trichet and the FT’s Martin Wolf will argue whether cutting now risks suffocating the fragile recovery of the global economy.

This page allows you to see the highlights from each contribution and join the discussion in the comment box at the end of this page.

“The great austerity debate”, FT.com, 18 July 2010.

This debate begins with contributions from Martin Wolf and Larry Summers. Niall Ferguson and Brad DeLong are next in the series. Registration is required to access this page, and free registrants are allowed to view a maximum of ten articles each month. Subscribers to FT have full access to this debate. Below are highlights from the first two articles.

Here is Martin Wolf:

The interaction of high indebtedness with deflation could create a cumulative downward spiral. A Japanese-style “lost decade” threatens the developed world. That is particularly likely if everybody starts to tighten together. If anything, further loosening is needed: in the first quarter of 2010, the gross domestic product of every member of the group of seven leading high-income countries was still below its pre-crisis peak.

Readers must make up their own minds on the merits of the arguments this week. My own strong sympathies are with the postponers. But of one thing everybody agrees: this debate matters. We cannot be sure who is right. But we can be sure that if policy-makers get it wrong, the results may well be dire.

Martin Wolf, “Why the battle is joined over tightening”, Financial Times, 19 July 2010.

And now, Larry Summers:

Economic commentators are mired in an unhelpful dialectic between “jobs” and “deficits” that, despite its apparent simplicity, has obscured rather than clarified the policy choices ahead in the US, Europe and elsewhere.

Critics have complained that President Barack Obama’s continued commitment both to support recovery in the short term and to reduce deficits in the medium and long term constitutes a “mixed message”. In fact, it is the only sensible course in an economy facing the twin challenges of an immediate shortage of demand and a fiscal path in need of correction to become sustainable.

Lawrence Summers, “America’s sensible stance on recovery”, Financial Times, 19 July 2010.

13 Bankers

Saturday, April 24th, 2010

Journalist Louis Uchitelle, in Sunday’s New York Times, reviews 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown by Simon Johnson and James Kwak (Pantheon, 2010). Uchitelle explains the meaning of the book’s title, and points out that its authors – now vocal critics of crony capitalism in the United States – failed to speak out before the current crisis erupted in 2008.

[T]he authors skewer Lawrence H. Summers, … Obama’s chief economist. In 1998, while he was deputy secretary in the Clinton Treasury, he opposed the efforts of Brooksley Born, then running the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, to regulate derivatives. Her efforts “provoked furious opposition, not only from Wall Street but also from the economic heavyweights of the federal government,” Johnson and Kwak write.

… Johnson and Kwak describe a phone call from Summers to Born that gives the book its title. “I have 13 bankers in my office,” he declared, “and they say if you go forward with this you will cause the worst financial crisis since World War II.”

No wonder derivatives remained unregulated. And in the end, they played a huge role in producing what was in fact “the worst financial crisis since World War II.” Summers was dead wrong.

But if the case against him and others is so obvious, why did Johnson and Kwak … fail to speak up before the crisis erupted? Johnson, in particular, has emerged as a critic only in the past two years. If only he had separated himself sooner from the legions of mainstream economists who insisted that bankers and markets would self-correct.

Louis Uchitelle, “Your Money, Their Pockets”, New York Times Sunday Book Review, 25 April 2010.

Johnson and Kwak blog at baselinescenario.com.

the best paragraph I read today

Wednesday, March 24th, 2010

Before he became Mr. Obama’s top economic adviser, Lawrence Summers told me a story about helping his daughter study for her Advanced Placement exam in American history. While doing so, Mr. Summers realized that the federal government had not passed major social legislation in decades. There was the frenzy of the New Deal, followed by the G.I. Bill, the Interstate Highway System, civil rights and Medicare — and then nothing worth its own section in the history books.

Now there is.

David Leonhardt, “In Health Care Bill, Obama Attacks Wealth Inequality”, New York Times, 24 March 2010.

The health care legislation, defective as it is, is an important move from health care as a privilege – available to those able and willing to pay for it – to health care as a right, available to everyone. US social policy is now closer to that of other wealthy nations.

Simon Johnson on the financial crisis

Friday, January 1st, 2010

MIT economist Simon Johnson explains that the policies embraced by key members of  Obama’s economic team are opposite those they supported during the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s. This charge applies in particular to Lawrence Summers, in charge of the White House National Economic Council, Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner, and David A. Lipton, who is now at the National Economic Council and the National Security Council. All three were heavily involved in preparing a US response to the Asian financial crisis.

In the 1990s, they were opposed to unconditional bailouts — providing money to troubled financial institutions with no strings attached. …. The Treasury philosophy was clear and tough: “a healthy financial system cannot be built on the expectation of bailouts,” Mr. Summers said in his American Economic Association speech in 2000. …
In the 1990s, the United States — working closely with the I.M.F. — insisted that crisis countries fundamentally restructure their financial systems, which involved forcing out top bank executives. In the United States during 2009, we not only kept our largest and most troubled banks intact (while on life support) but allowed the biggest six financial conglomerates to become larger, both in absolute terms and relative to the economy. ….

Presumably this time, the Summers-Geithner-Lipton group will argue that the only way to restore confidence was through the kind of unconditional and implicit bailout guarantees they opposed in the 1990s.

If true, this has a terrible implication. The structure of our financial system has not changed in any way that will reduce reckless risk-taking by banks that are large enough to cause significant damage when they threaten to fail.

Simon Johnson, “Lessons Learned but Not Applied”, Economix, 31 December 2009.

Prospect Magazine named Simon Johnson as the “clear winner” out of 25 economists who have made notable contributions to “public conversation” during the current financial crisis:

His ideas are well grounded in theory, but he has also done more than any academic to popularise his case: writing articles, a must-read blog, and appearing tirelessly on television. As the FT’s Martin Wolf told Prospect: “Johnson’s significance is that he is a member of the establishment—a former IMF chief economist, no less—who has emphasised the capture of the state by big finance, for the latter’s own ends. An expert on crises in emerging countries and in transition from communism, he has called what he has seen: crony capitalism at the heart of the financial system.”

Jonathan Ford, “Public intellectuals and the financial crisis”, Prospect Magazine, 16 December 2009.

Martin Wolf made Prospect’s short list of 25, along with NY Times columnist Paul Krugman and Columbia University economist Joseph Stiglitz.

value-added taxes

Sunday, December 13th, 2009

Journalist Catherine Rampell asks why the government of the United States, following the lead of “nearly 150 other countries, in developed and developing economies alike”, does not collect some type of VAT (sometimes called, as in Canada, a “goods and services tax”, or GST).

Her answer?

Politics, mostly. Back in 1988, Lawrence Summers — now President Obama’s chief economic adviser — explained this with an observant quip: “Liberals think it’s regressive and conservatives think it’s a money machine.”

If they reverse their positions, the VAT may happen, he said.

Catherine Rampell, “Value-Added Taxes: Not So Foreign”, Economix, 11 December 2009.

For a clear explanation of how value-added taxes work, see Ms Rampell’s New York Times article:

Catherine Rampell, “Many See the VAT Option as a Cure for Deficits”, New York Times, 11 December 2009.

Ms Rampell’s NY Times profile explains “Catherine grew up in South Florida (the New York part) and graduated from Princeton”.

Larry Summers at the White House

Sunday, October 4th, 2009

The New Yorker magazine has a long and very detailed profile of Lawrence H Summers, who was Bill Clinton’s Treasury Secretary and is now director of Obama’s National Economic Council, the office that coördinates economic policy. The following passages caught my eye.

[Larry] Summers was born in 1954 in New Haven, Connecticut, where he lived until he was five. His parents were both economists, and his father taught at Yale, but the family moved to the suburbs of Philadelphia so that he could take a teaching job at the University of Pennsylvania. Two of Summers’s uncles, Paul Samuelson and Kenneth Arrow, were also economists. Summers’s childhood was not quite like that of the other kids in postwar suburbia; he and two younger brothers—one is now a psychiatrist and the other is a lawyer—were taught from grade school to approach life with an economist’s view of the world. ….

Summers … was accepted at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He thought of majoring in math but decided to stick with the family business of economics. ….

At M.I.T., Summers focussed on working through real-world problems using rigorous methods, rather than following the drift of many of his peers, who, he believed, were building elegant and useless theories just for the sake of it. When he applied to the graduate program in economics at Harvard, where he studied from 1975 to 1979, the beginning of his essay read, “Many children are taught to believe in God. I came to believe in the power of systems analysis.” ….

Summers told me that, as a graduate student, he first studied claims, made famous by economists at the University of Chicago, that financial markets are always rational and self-correcting. He said, “I encountered a sentence that was much quoted: ‘The efficient-market hypothesis is the best established fact in social sciences.’ Any sentence like that is a red flag to an ambitious academic.” Summers produced a body of work that undermined the efficient-market hypothesis, or E.M.H.

Ryan Lizza, “Inside the Crisis: Larry Summers and the White House economic team”, The New Yorker,  12 October 2009.

There is much more in the full article. Ryan Lizza has been Washington Correspondent for The New Yorker since 2007.